Organisational Form and Retailing Development: The Department and the Chain Store, 1860–1940

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Alfred Chandler advanced the notion that after the First World War successful diversifying concerns in manufacturing shifted from centralised ('U' form) management structures to multidivisional ('M' form) product-based organisation. Precisely the opposite occurred in the retail sector, where the rate of turnover growth of department stores – a form of retailing based on a managerial arrangement analogous to the 'M' form of organisation in manufacturing – slowed considerably from the second decade of this century and that of chain stores – as exemplars of highly-centralised managerial decision-making – expanded rapidly. Various factors contributed to this phenomenon. However, this paper argues that the distinctive forms of organisation of the two retailing concepts made a major contribution to the different experiences of the two forms of retailing in the interwar era. The devolved managerial arrangement of the department store, which exploited economies of scope, was adapted to exploit retailing opportunities before 1914. Thereafter it proved an obstacle in retailing circumstances to which the highly-centralised control and merchandise specialisation of the chain-store organisation were more adapted.

I

A doyen among business historians of recent times, Alfred Chandler has argued that successful enterprises in the USA after the First World War adopted a multidivisional ('M' form) of organisation in place of highly-

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centralised ('U' form) management structures [Chandler, 1962: 225–82; Chandler, 1977: 58–62, 225–61, 419–23; Chandler and Tedlow, 1985: 310–26]. In a nutshell this involved devolution of authority within firms from 'headquarters' to the divisions responsible for marketing individual or related products. Chandler's empirical evidence is essentially drawn from the experience of manufacturing enterprises. However, Chandler has also been acknowledged as a 'retail expert' [Bluestone *et al.*, 1981: 17]. He assumed that contemporary large-scale retailing concerns confronted 'management problems similar to those which [were faced by] Du Pont, General Motors, and Jersey Standard ... and for much the same reasons' [Chandler, 1962: 225]. The argument to be developed here is that precisely the opposite occurred in the area of retailing in the interwar era. After a period of remarkable expansion up to the First World War, in what was to become known as the 'Golden Age' of the department store, the retail turnover of department stores (based on a form of organisation analogous to the 'M' in the manufacturing and exploiting economies of scope) more or less stagnated. That of chain or multiple stores (organised on a 'U' basis and focusing on specific merchandise categories) increased in a quite spectacular fashion.

II

In the relevant historical literature on department stores there are difficulties of definition. The problems stem essentially from superficiality in approach; being based on the scale of the establishment and the range of merchandise offered for sale. These are relative entities. The typical department store of the *belle époque* was an impressive building; rivalling for dominance of urban vistas cathedrals, railway stations and city halls in floorspace and height. Size, however, was a subjective perception. In pre-1914 Germany, for example, what were perceived as department stores (*Warenhäuser*) ranged from the 23,053 square metres of the Wertheim store on Berlin's Leipzigerstrasse down to the 840 square metres of floor space at the Tietz outlet in Mannheinm [Hirsch, 1913; Wernicke, 1913: 51].

A.T. Stewart's extensive 'Marble Palace', which opened for business in New York in 1846 (with the 'marble' effect being created by paint on the cast iron structure), has been considered the pioneer of the department-store by the historian of the enterprise [Resseguie, 1965: 301–22; Resseguie, 1962: 255–86; Resseguie, 1964: 131–62; Brough, 1982: 32]. On the other hand, the author of a recent social history of retailing considers that it 'offered too limited a range of merchandise to be called the first department store' [Strasser, 1989: 206]. Edward A. Filene who managed the Boston store bearing his family name from the 1910s was adamant that it was 'not a department store, but a specialty shop', as it carried 'only about 10 per cent as many classes of goods as Macy's' (in New York) [Filene, 1930: 275]. A study of industrial relations at Filene's, published in 1930, described the retail outlet as 'a departmental specialty shop' [La Dame, 1930: 74]. John Wanamaker, who is generally considered a pioneer of the department store in the USA, in Philadelphia from the 1870s, frequently disclaimed that his was a department store because: 'It does not deal in liquors, groceries, drugs or "everything that can be sold at a profit"'. His preferred term was 'composite store' [Appel, 1930: 100; Gibbons, 1926: I, 161].

One study states: 'When a retail store provides for most of our retail requirements in addition to clothing, with departments supplying furniture, jewellery, foodstuffs, and many other wares, boasts a restaurant, beauty salon, rest rooms or other amenities, it must be a large establishment and is considered a department store in the fullest sense' [Ferry, 1960: 10]. In reality retail outlets generally recognised as 'department stores' existed long before they sold furniture (in the main from the 1920s) and had added (if at all) such facilities as restaurants and beauty salons etc. Macy's in New York began to sell furniture in 1896: two decades after the business was generally recognised as a 'department store' [Pasermadjian, 1954: 5, Hower, 1943: 236]. Restaurants first became common in department stores in the USA from the 1890s and beauty parlours were added in some from around the turn of the century [Strasser, 1989: 210].

The Standard Industrial Classification Manual in the USA defines department stores as: 'Retail stores carrying a general line of apparel, such as suits, coats, dresses, accessories; home furnishings, such as table and kitchen appliances, dishes and utensils' [Bluestone et al., 1981: 3].[1] Establishments recognised as department stores actually precede the appearance of 'off-the-peg' clothing. According to one US retailing expert, writing in the late 1920s:

> Ready-to-wear specialty stores were once considered a menace to department stores. That was only a few years back. The department stores had built their business around piece goods and the theory of individual costuming, and could not be convinced of the change in public preference for ready-made garments. [Guernsey, 1929: 20]

Implied in one 1930s definition of a 'department store' is an absence of a section devoted to groceries. In Britain: 'the central premises, and often some of the branches of the larger co-operative societies are indistinguishable in organisation from the department store proper, although from the point of view of the goods offered there is clearly a marked difference from the importance of the food departments in co-operative stores' [Smith, 1937: 49]. A large proportion of the retail outlets recognised as department stores never sold foodstuffs. On the other hand, the food hall at Harrod's in London's Knightsbridge became among its major attractions.

The scope of merchandise in what were perceived to be department stores before 1914 was a major source of attraction to customers. However, the essential feature that distinguished this form of retailing was its internal organisation. This is alluded to, but not sufficiently stressed, in the definition adopted by the US Bureau of Census in the 1920s, where it is considered to be a retail outlet 'organised by department handling a wide variety of merchandise'. Similarly, according to one study: 'A department store is a large store, organised by departments, selling under one management a wide variety of merchandise [Hendrickson, 1979: 349; Mahoney and Sloane, 1966: 9]. However, in these definitions the allusion to departmental organisation is essentially based upon the diversity of the merchandise they retailed and the scale of the enterprise, rather than recognition of an organisational characteristic that fundamentally differentiated department stores from other forms of retailing.

In the era before the First World War, when the department store emerged and developed rapidly, the essence of the form of retailing was one in which: 'Each department of a store is, in effect, a separate retail shop, and is in [the] charge of a buyer who is normally responsible for selling what he has bought' [Neal, 1932: 21]. This definition has to be qualified somewhat, in that an extent of overall control was vested in central management. However, it does identify the key feature of the department store; namely the degree of independence afforded the head of each section. As the earliest historian of Macy's of New York put it: 'a department store is a retail institution organised by merchandise departments; that is with administrative subdivisions corresponding to the physical segregations of merchandise, each one having its own manager and salesforce, with a central accounting system which keeps a record of income and expense attributable to that particular division of the store' [Hower, 1943: 68].

The devolved managerial arrangement of department stores emerged over the course of the second half of the nineteenth century, essentially in response to the founding proprietor finding it impossible to both manage a large store and act as the buyer for an increasingly diversified range of merchandise. Fundamental in the emergence of the department store is a division of labour within the acquisition of goods for retailing. The focus was upon the section head as a 'buyer', in an era when it was necessary to develop contacts, often involving extensive travel abroad, to acquire merchandise that would attract customers to the store. '... The delegation of buying to specialised employees opened the way to unprecedented combinations of merchandise within a single firm' [Hower, 1943: 149]. The departmental form of organisation enabled firms to exploit economies of specialisation within the combination of the buying and selling functions, achieve volume turnover and attract customers through the range of merchandise offered.

In essence, arguably, it is the move to provide the head of each department with a considerable degree of autonomy in buying as well as selling that justifies the claim of the Bon Marché establishment, which opened in 1869 Paris, to have been the first department store.[2] Subsequently, operations in the typical department store, as the staff director of Selfridges from its opening in 1909 later recalled: 'were centralised in regard to general management, but to the departmental managers or buyers was left the responsibility for the management of the department. They were controlled only with regard to the maximum amount they could have at a given time invested in their stocks' [Pound, 1960: 63]. In Germany, where chains of department stores emerged as early as the 1890s, responsibility for buying most merchandise remained in the hands of the departmental heads in individual stores [Tietz, 1965: 138]. In some cases entire departments were leased out to independent retailers.[3] Examples include L. Straus & Sons which operated the china, glass and silver wares department at Macy's from 1874 and later at Wanamaker's (Philadelphia), Woodward & Lathrop's (Washington, DC), Abraham & Straus (Brooklyn) and J.H. White (Chicago) [Johnson, 1964: 160–1; Hower, 1943: 220–1].[4] The autonomy of department heads, even when they were employees, extended not only to the negotiation of purchases from suppliers, but also to the presentation of merchandise and the hire, supervision and generally the right to fire sales staff [Pasermadjian, 1954: 11; Miller, 1981: 65; Mazur, 1927: 74].

The buyer/department head has been described by one authority on retailing, writing in the mid-1920s, as 'the once complete autocrat of retailing'. 'To his buyers', John Wanamaker, founder of major stores in Philadelphia and New York, 'gave great freedom. He liked to call them merchants, as though they were operating their own stores.... These merchant heads were held responsible for the merchandise, turnover, profits, volume of sales, direct expenses and general satisfaction of the customer, but they had no worries on financing, as this was handled by another branch of the business' [Mazur, 1927: 66; Appel, 1930: 365]. In such an organisational context the control exercised by central management was limited. Into the 1920s it could be said that: 'In very few instances is the store manager the outstanding executive in the business' [Mazur, 1927: 16]. Originally, in the Paris department stores of the Second Empire, control over buyers seems to have taken the form of a maximum advance for the purchase of merchandise. Subsequently, the basis became periodic data collected on the ratio of a department's inventory to its sales. Before the 1900s, available accounting methods, known as bookkeeping, severely limited the control central management could impose on department heads. They provided only a record of the extent to which individual buyers had in the past – often some time before the data had been collated and analysed – adhered to prescribed retail margins and a desirable ratio between turnover and inventory [Hower, 1943: 302–3, 370–2].

A key element in the success or failure of a department store was therefore the selection of heads of departments. '... There was', as one historian of a department store observed, 'a tendency to blame the buyer if the departmental operations were considered unsatisfactory, even if the trouble was beyond his control. Accordingly, the first remedy considered was likely to be replacing the buyer' [Hower, 1943: 304].

As the range of merchandise offered by each department expanded, a function of central management was to identify new areas of related goods and create new departments [Appel, 1930: 365]. Bader, the head of Galeries Lafayette in Paris before 1914, was of the view that the 'understanding' (*sechel*) reached up to a turnover of a million francs a year and beyond that it was necessary to divide up the department. [Tietz, 1965: 111]. Otherwise, in the archetypal department store of the pre-1914 era, the functions of central management were limited to such matters as allocating overhead costs between departments, operating common services that included deliveries to customers and raising finance for merchandise purchases. This, in essence was 'the presiding genius', the contribution of Aristide Boucicaut, the founder of Bon Marché, to the evolution of retailing [Hower, 1943: 73, 413].

III

As with department stores, no universally accepted definition of a chain or multiple retail concern emerged, other than the operation of more than one store. Even here the minimum number of outlets employed in US enumerations from the 1920s varied from two to four. The former minimum was adopted by the Federal Trade Commission and the latter by the Bureau of Census [Beckman and Nolen, 1938: 2–3]. Generally speaking, organisational form was recognised as the distinguishing feature of a chain. A chain-store for Channing E. Schweitzer, managing director of the US National Retail Dry Goods Association in the 1920s, was: 'One of a group of stores which are centrally administered and centrally managed' [Bloomfield, 1930: 17]. Chain concerns included, according to another 1920s definition, 'any group of retail stores or service units, large or small, dealing in the same line of goods or services, and under the same central management' [Hayward and White, 1928: 1].

A definition derived from organisational arrangement was not acceptable to everybody concerned with the chain-store phenomenon between the world wars. In the opinion of W.D. Darby, those derived from organisational form were no more precise than ones based upon the minimum number of stores a firm operated [Darby. 1928: 9]. His view may have been influenced by association with the body representing the interests of US 'chain stores', under considerable attack from independent storekeepers after 1918. From Darby's perspective a definition derived from the centralisation of management excluded co-operative buying organisations among small shopkeepers, including those organised by wholesalers in response to competition from 'chain stores', and persons operating retail franchises. These were potential allies in countering the small-shopkeeper agitation against multiples in the retailing area.

Even a broader definition of 'chain-store', as advocated by Darby to include franchising arrangements and co-operative buying organisations, involved a separation of the functions of buying and selling, with the centralisation of control over the former and to a considerable extent over the latter. This represented a radical departure from the inherited basis of retailing, whether small shops or department stores, which was the integration of buying and selling. Within that rubric, the degree of centralisation of control was the major determinant of the success or failure of a 'chain-store' concern in the interwar era. As Darby observed of chains in the 1920s: 'Some are centrally owned but independently operated. Some are centrally controlled and operated – **this being the prevailing and most successful type**'. [Darby, 1928: 9. Emphasis added.]

In comparison to the department store, the chain retail outlet was characterised essentially by the very limited autonomy enjoyed by the managers of individual outlets belonging to the chain. Even in the J.C. Penney chain, where the store managers were part owners of the outlets they operated: 'About all the accounting the store manager has to do is make a daily report of receipts and expenditures' [Darby, 1928: 93]. In particular, the purchase of merchandise was undertaken by specialist headquarters' staff. The hiring and firing of sales staff was also, especially in respect of males, concentrated in the hands of personnel departments at headquarters. The layout of the store and procedures in its operation were similarly standardised. In the case of A & P, the largest grocery chain in the USA by the 1900s, the lay-out of the stores was so uniform that the owner's boast was that he could walk blindfolded into any of them and locate a can of pork and beans [Hayward and White, 1928: 39; Mahoney and Sloane, 1966: 175–6]. Typically:

> The process of standardisation is extended to almost every phase of chain activity; the stores are alike in appearance; the interior equipment is the same; the stock and the position of the stock on the

> shelves of one store corresponds to that of any other store in the chain; the instructions given for running the stores are identical. Each manager has to fill out the same forms daily; to carry out the same routine of caring for cash, of locking up for the night, of all the detailed minutiae of storekeeping'. [Hayward and White, 1928: 39]

'Standardisation' is a keyword in publications on chain stores in the 1920s. The standardisation of chain store outlets, in terms of appearance, layout and operation, conferred certain benefits. An increasingly mobile public was made aware of what to expect in terms of the merchandise on offer and where to locate it in individual stores. Economies of scale in the purchase of shop fittings could be exploited. In an era of rapid expansion in the number of outlets, time was therefore saved in the addition of new branches to the chain. In particular, the arrangement facilitated the transfer of core staff from existing to new stores [Hayward and White, 1928: 39, 80; Darby, 1928: 49, 57; Neal, 1932: 51].

Another keyword in the interwar literature on chain stores is 'scientific' – more than implying that the form of retailing exemplified the 'scientific management' espoused by Frederick Taylor etc. Yet another is 'headquarters', with its military connotation doubtless derived from the First World War experience. Managers were expected to 'Follow instructions from headquarters immediately' and to 'Do everything that is called for regardless of personal feeling' [Hayward and White, 1928: 311]. The Ross Stores multiple, established in 1921, adopted a '"military system" of promotion' [Baxter, 1928: 154]. Railway companies, with their dispersed labour force requiring co-ordination, also provided a model for the chain-store concerns. According to one 1920s study: 'The chain store manager is comparable to the engineer in a locomotive' [Hayward and White, 1928: 8].

IV

The department store of the *fin de siècle* era possessed other advantages apart from its devolved managerial organisation over the existing forms of small-scale, independent retail outlets. It was a relatively large store, offering a range of merchandise at central city sites in the era of the tram and suburban railways focusing on such situations. Through trading on multi-floor levels, assisted by lifts, a department store was able to minimise the rental or opportunity costs of such sites in relation to annual turnover, in an era that preceded the rapid growth of competition for office space in inner-city locations from other branches of the tertiary sector (most notably financial services).

As essentially cash businesses before 1914, and through the scale of orders placed with suppliers, department stores were able to sell goods at lower prices than the competition consisting almost entirely of small shopkeepers. The latter were generally dependent on credit (extended to customers and received from wholesalers). Through their cash flow and high turnover, department stores were able to meet suppliers invoices within the thirty-day terms usually extended. Merchandising a range of products, they were in a position to vary the selling space allotted to areas of merchandise and move sales staff in accordance with seasonal variations in consumer demand.

However, the distinctive characteristic of the department store was the devolution of managerial authority and, arguably, this made a major contribution to the success of the new form of retailing before the First World War. In particular, it facilitated the employment of specialist buyers for distinct merchandise areas. This is recognised in the Will of Aristide Boucicaut, the founder of Bon Marché, which stipulated that an outsider be appointed director of the entire establishment after his death. The selection of a head of a department from within the store for the position he considered as being a potential source of 'envy and unpleasantness' [Stresemann, 1900: 688–9].

The founder of Bon Marché died in 1877, eight years after his enduring monument opened for business in central Paris. His son had little interest in the enterprise. He died two years after his father. Aristide senior's widow and succeeding owner of the enterprise survived until 1887, mostly living outside Paris and uninvolved in what became the model department store in the pre-1914 era. Overall control of the enterprise became vested in a 'council' of administrators, whose major concerns were the allocation of overhead costs to the various departments and monitoring 'sales' mark-downs by the heads of the latter [Miller, 1981: 65–6].

Rowland H. Macy, the founder of the famous New York department store, also died in 1877 (followed a year later by his junior partner Abiel LaForge) [Hower, 1943: 157–60]. Yet the store more than survived until 1888, when Isidor and Nathan Straus (lessees of the porcelain and glassware sections in the store) took it over. Isidor, who headed the Macy management, was essentially a competent and cautious accountant [Hower, 1943: 217]. In the interim, control of the enterprise rested in 'the relatively inexperienced hands' of Charles Webster, a distant cousin of the founder and previously a floor walker in the store. Jerome B. Wheeler, a flour merchant brought in as a partner, quickly became totally absorbed with speculating in Colorado silver mines and real estate [Hower, 1943: 157–60; Hower, 1940: 472–87]. A biographer of Macy attributes the continued expansion of the store's turnover to his subject having established 'a strong and well-defined pattern of operation' [Johnson, 1964: 186]. Arguably, this consisted of the high degree of autonomy vested in department heads.

There were outstanding entrepreneurs who figured in the development of department stores before 1914. Rowland Macy in New York, John Wanamaker in Philadelphia and Gordon Selfridge in London, immediately spring to mind. Department stores, in the opinion of the economist Alfred Marshall, 'in the hands of an exceptional genius, ... sometimes rise with meteor-like rapidity and splendour' [Marshall, 1919: 298]. In his study of Lewis's in Britain, Asa Briggs employs out of context the terms 'exceptional genius', and 'great energy and insight', to suggest that these were the basic characteristics of the entrepreneurs who pioneered department-store retailing before 1914 [Briggs, 1956: 21]. The facts speak otherwise. The talents expressed by the more outstanding of Aristide Boucicaut's imitators were essentially those of 'showmen'.

Although located in the central areas of major cities, the public had to be motivated to use the intra-urban transport system to visit department stores, which were often not located in close proximity to the hub of the network. This was done by advertising, promotions and the provision of consumer services. Many of the imitators of Boucicaut functioned as 'ringmasters', selecting and generally overseeing the activities of departmental heads, and in the creation of a public image of their enterprises as attractions to potential customers. They possessed 'the dash of the circus proprietor'. As Fred Lazarus, the founder of department stores in the major cities of Ohio, observed: 'A good store is like a circus'. In many instances, 'the head of the business was primarily a publicity man and not a merchant in the old sense' [Wendt and Kogan, 1952: 201; Hendrickson, 1979: 45]. It has been said of Gordon Selfridge, the founder of the famous London store, 'that he was more successful as a showman than as a salesman' and that 'little evidence can be found of his having fully thought out merchandising policy' [Pound, 1960: 190]. The outstanding initial success of Rowland Macy's store in New York was primarily based upon his ability as a promoter [Hower, 1940: 483–4].

The publicity efforts of H. Gordon Selfridge soon established his store in London, opened in 1909, as a tourist attraction that rivalled Buckingham Palace and the Tower. Known as 'Mile a Minute Harry' when he ran the Marshall Field department store in Chicago from the early 1880s to the early 1900s, Selfridge was noted for his 'exuberant showmanship' and 'theatrical' approach to retailing [Wendt and Kogan, 1952: 206–7]. He opened his own store in London's Oxford Street in 1909 with the exhibition of the aeroplane in which Louis Blériot made the first flight over the Channel. The novelty drew huge crowds, to view something so unfamiliar that a sign with an arrow was attached to the front to indicate the direction in which it flew [Pound, 1960: 81–2; Ferry, 1960: 18]. Otherwise, to attract people to the store Selfridge installed an information counter at which customers could ask 'trivial pursuit' type questions (such as the date of birth of the King of Siam), a 'Reading Room' and on the roof a 'Winter Garden' – later renamed 'Hanging Gardens' – to induce potential customers to explore the store. 'The lift girls', at the store, 'were attractions in themselves, with their jaunty white caps and white kid boots. They were chosen for their good appearance ... and some of them made good marriages, thus providing more publicity for the store' [Pound, 1960: 207].

What has been described as the 'genius' of Rowland H. Macy, as the creator of the famous New York department store, consisted of his outstanding ability in the area of advertising copywriting and layout. In an era when most advertising was of the classified type, (and advertising agencies did not exist, except as brokers of space in newspapers and magazines) it was not too difficult to produce display advertising that 'stood out'. However, Macy did demonstrate exceptional talents in this area [Hower, 1943: 54–65; Johnson, 1964, 80ff, 119–24]. The same applies to John Wanamaker. He has been credited with 'inventing modern store advertising' [Appel, 1930: 306; Gibbons, 1926: I, 96–109, II, 14–27].[5]

John Wanamaker was 'a merchant who "staged" his stores, dramatising them, making them living panoramas of commerce, colossal productions of the thought and craft of (sic) man; with lavish exhibits and decorations and display rooms and auditoriums' [Appel, 1930: xv–xvii].[6] Nevertheless, Wanamaker was convinced that the qualities of buyers rather than advertising were the key to the success or failure of a department store. It would seem that Wanamaker used his advertising department, in which he took a leading role, as a spur and form of control over his buyers. 'He declared that the merchandise had to come up to the standard of the advertising, and that it was the task of his buyers, if they wanted their departments mentioned and their offerings featured, to have goods worthy of finding a place on the Wanamaker pages in the newspapers'. The actual producer (from 1880) of Wanamaker advertisements, John E. Powers, once refused to advertise footwear for an entire year after the head of the department provided false information [Gibbons, 1926: II, 22; Fox, 1984: 27].

However, by the mid-1880s when the Philadelphia department store was well-established, and especially by 1889 when the founder was appointed Postmaster-General in President Harrison's Cabinet, his eldest son Thomas (who joined the business in 1883) was effectively running the concern. Thomas, who 'developed a liking for figures' in his youth:

> was the store's control over finances, expenses, profits and stock budgets for the merchandise departments. Every morning he would

> have before him the sales' sheet, stock sheet with daily purchases, direct expenses of each department, the cash vouchers and requisitions. When requisitions would grow too large he would tear them up, saying: 'If the supplies are really needed they will be asked for again'. When direct expenses would grow too heavy he would send for the department chief and tell him he must reduce his [sales] force. When stocks grew too large in proportion to sales he would stop further purchases for a few days. [Appel, 1930: x–xi]

As 'circus proprietors', an essential talent of the founders of successful department stores lay in their ability to hire 'good acts', in the form of buyer heads of departments. The key role of the latter is illustrated by the dissolution in 1881 of the department-store partnership between Marshall Field and Levi Leitner in Chicago. After obtaining assurances from the department heads that they would stay with the concern if he bought his partner out, Field approached Leitner with the offer to either sell his share to Field or buy him out for the ridiculously low amount of $2.5 million. (Sales the previous year had been $25 million.) After consulting the buyers Leitner, who had an exceptionally abrasive manner and was unpopular with the department heads, accepted the proposal [Wendt and Kogan, 1952: 165–6]. Marshall Field went on to hire H. Gordon Selfridge.

V

The period from c.1880 to 1914 has been referred to as 'the Golden Age' of the department store. It is in this era that the 'names' still associated with department stores were essentially established. They include Bon Marché and Galeries Lafayette etc. of Paris, Harrods and Selfridges of London, Macy's in New York and Marshall Field of Chicago. In the USA the mail-order concerns Sears Roebuck and Montgomery Ward began to open stores from the mid-1920s. Although called department stores, in organisational terms they were centrally-controlled chain stores. Arguably this was a factor that contributed to their success.

From the 1920s department stores organised along multi-divisional lines at best maintained their share of retail turnover. Profit margins were under increasing pressure [McNair, 1930: 105; McNair, 1931: 179; Emmet, 1930: 9; Burnham, 1940: 463]. The data available is not especially accurate, on account of contemporary problems of definition as to what constituted a 'department store' and the methods involved in collection. For the USA it consists of data voluntarily supplied by stores to the Harvard Bureau of Business Research and index numbers derived from sampling by the Federal Reserve Board. It is generally accepted that the Harvard data tended to be representative of the more successful enterprises [Nystrom, 1930: 97]. As one student of retailing observed in the later 1920s of the data collected in this manner: 'How many stores proud to report in other years just sort of overlooked this year because they did not want to report their descent into the red?'. The statistics obviously exclude concerns that went bankrupt. Nevertheless, in the boom year of 1928, 43 per cent of the 413 stores reporting recorded a net loss, after deducting interest of six per cent on capital, the rate on government bonds, as the opportunity cost of the capital invested in them [Guernsey, 1929: 77]. On average net returns from sales declined from 3.6 per cent in 1924 to 1.6 per cent in 1928 [Le Boutillier, 1930: 296].

Located on central city sites, department stores were adversely affected by the motorisation and ongoing suburbanisation of society. City centres became jammed with vehicular traffic. Parking became a problem that was in general too costly for the stores to solve by providing spaces for cars. The eventual solution for some concerns was to establish branch stores in the suburbs. The situation provided a *niche* for Sears Roebuck and Montgomery Ward in particular, when the mail-order concerns began in the mid-1920s to establish fixed retail outlets. Demographics was the particular interest of General Robert Wood, who took over the operation of Sears Roebuck in 1924 and initiated the move into store development. 'Sears stores were built around the automobile'. To an extent this applied to the merchandise as well as the location of the stores. In the 1920s car tyres became the largest single item in turnover [Katz, 1987: 44; Emmet, 1930: 72].

As a form of retailing the department store exploited the centripetal tendencies of intra-urban transportation in the second half of the nineteenth century, in the forms of the tram and the suburban railway. The chain store phenomenon was to an extent a response to the centrifugal transportation tendency produced by 'motorisation' in the twentieth century. The rapid increase in chain-store turnover into the 1920s occurred through expansion in the number of stores rather than in sales per outlet [Nystrom, 1930: 97].

The geographical dispersion of chain outlets, as compared with usually single-site department stores, acted to spread risk, in that the concern as a whole was less exposed to short-term or secular downturns in sales in any particular locality on account of its dependence upon certain economic activities or a strike of some duration. Within that context only a modest amount was invested in fittings etc. for individual stores, which were usually on leased premises. These latter characteristics of chain outlets also permitted experimentation with locations.

The decline of foreign trade over the course of the First World War, and the subsequent tendency toward increased tariffs, especially high on 'luxuries' in response to the 'cost' and the 'sacrifice' occasioned by the war, had a negative impact on department stores. Before 1914 it was common for department store buyers to make trips covering large areas of Europe, and by the 1890s also parts of Asia, in search of exotic and distinctive merchandise at attractive prices. For Gordon Selfridge in the 1900s one of the main attractions of London as a site for a store was that: 'London is the capital of the only big Free Trade country in the world' [Pound, 1960: 33].

An increase in the ratio of costs to turnover was identified by contemporary analysts as the major source of the pressure on department-store profits. The squeeze on profits came essentially from increased outlays on advertising, promotions and customer services [Mazur, 1927: 157]. Advertising and services accounted for a substantial and growing proportion of department store costs, especially as a number of them in major cities began to compete with each other rather than against relatively small-scale specialty shops. By the later 1920s in the USA estimated costs of department-store advertising alone was the equivalent of 3 to 4 per cent of turnover [Emmet, 1930: 23]. Customer services had played an important role in the promotion of department stores before 1914 and there was a tendency to further extend these in response to the trading difficulties experienced thereafter. By the later 1920s the cost of deliveries averaged about 1.5 per cent of department-store turnover [Hayward and White, 1928: 383]. On the other hand, into the 1920s and beyond such outlays were minimal in the case of chain stores [Neal, 1932: 37]. Most chains relied on the attraction of low prices, the fixed price concept ('five-and ten' etc.) window display and public familiarity with the storefronts of individual shops and what lay behind them. At this point in time the chains were essentially competing with independent retailers on the basis of price [Hayward and White, 1928: 19]. By the later 1920s competition between the chains was beginning to be more significant and to stimulate increasing outlays on advertising [Darby, 1928: 49–50; Hayward and White, 1928: 29–30].

Partly in response to the competition of chain 'variety stores' such as Woolworths from the 1910s, department stores increased the emphasis upon the sale of merchandise with a relatively high unit cost: in particular furniture but also household appliances. This development necessitated a shift from a 'cash-and-carry' to the provision of consumer credit. Most department stores seem to have viewed this as an extension of the various 'services' they provided; including the right to exchange goods, even after they had been used. The impression at least is that the provision of credit – in the relatively high interest-rate climate of the 1920s, the sharp downturns that punctuated the booms from the mid-1910s and the comparatively primitive consumer credit-rating facilities of the era – was not a very profitable branch of store activity. However, it was considered necessary in order to meet the challenge of competition from chain stores, which remained essentially cash businesses, as well as to sell the more expensive merchandise (most notably furniture) that department stores tended to move into in response to that competition.

The initial expansion of chain concerns was constrained by reliance upon profits as the source of investment capital [Hayward and White, 1928: 2, 32]. However, by the 1920s in the USA a number of the larger firms were sufficiently established to attract loans from banks and to float share issues. As early as 1912, at the time of the amalgamation of interests, representatives of the banking houses Goldman, Sachs and Phillip Lehman took seats on the board of the F.W. Woolworth concern [Strasser, 1989: 223]. By the later 1920s, it could be stated that: 'Each year the list of chain security offerings grows larger, and the chain issues listed on stock exchanges keep pace.... Furthermore, the banking houses which formerly treated chain enterprises coldly as too speculative for underwriting now vie with each other for the privilege' [Hayward and White, 1928: 12, 263; Guernsey, 1929: 26]. This can in part be viewed as an 'externality' generated by the earlier success of department stores.

The multi-divisional organisational form of department stores became a major obstacle to growth in the interwar period. This was in part due to the range of new merchandise that came to account for an increasing proportion of retail turnover between the world wars. Such products included automobiles, radios, gramophones, vacuum cleaners, refrigerators and washing-machines. These products bore little and often no relationship to the lines of merchandise hitherto retailed by department stores. Therefore, the form of organisation of the department store was not shaped for expansion into selling these products. In the words of one department-store executive, writing in the late 1920s: 'Not one store in twenty-five is making any money in radio. They let the little specialty radio shops take the lead away from them early in its development, treating radio as if it were a toy and often carrying it in the toy department'.

As single-outlet operations, department stores were generally slow to exploit economies from bulk purchasing through amalgamations. What were called 'ownership groups' emerged among US department stores after the First World War. In 1918, on the initiative of Lincoln Filene of the Boston concern, a group of stores in different cities formed the Retail Research Association, later the Associated Merchandise Corporation, to study and exchange information on common merchandising problems [Mahoney and Sloane, 1966: 109–11]. Gimbel's, which operated three stores under its own name by 1909, added Saks Fifth Avenue (New York) in 1923 and operated a total of six by 1929 [Mahoney and Sloane, 1966: 109–11; Harris, 1977: 338ff]. Other 'ownership groups' that had emerged by the later 1920s in the USA included Hahn Department Stores, Associated Dry-Goods, May Department Stores, National Department Stores (14 outlets), American Department Stores (18 stores), Hale Brothers Stores (five outlets on the West Coast), W.A. Wieboldt (four stores in the outlying districts of Chicago) [Emmet, 1930: 51–2; Falk, 1930: 266; Hayward and White, 1928, 213; Bluestone et al., 1981: 23–4].

In many cases the merger initiatives in the 1920s came from investment bankers rather than store managements. The bankers were motivated by 'the legitimate selfish desire ... to make a profit in the creation and sale of securities'. Individual department stores were persuaded to merge their interests by the rapid expansion of the chains, relative to the limited growth of department-store sales and rising costs of operation. The investing public was persuaded to buy the shares offered in the merged concerns comprising by then often famous store names, the size of their combined sales and, in particular, the presumed ease with which chain-store methods (especially centralised buying) could be adopted [Guernsey, 1929: 177–8; Emmet, 1930: 52–3]. In practice, it proved extremely difficult both to form chains of department stores and to change the organisational basis of the individual stores in the merged concerns.

Even within the limited number of horizontal integrations in the department store area, the centralisation of purchasing, and the standardisation of merchandise offered for sale, proceeded only slowly. Commenting on the situation in 1930, a retailing expert remarked: 'Not infrequently the economies of central buying are advanced as the justification for merger; yet an examination of a number of organisations, each operating a number of department stores, reveals that central buying is being applied to a very limited extent' [Falk, 1930: 265]. With Allied Stores Corporation (formed in 1928), embracing 34 department stores by the later 1930s, 'central-office functions [were] limited to the control of general policies, while merchandising management was delegated to the individual stores' [Beckman and Nolen, 1938: 4–5]. As one contemporary department store executive observed:

> to a chain store man these are not chains at all. The chain store man is unable to understand what the so-called chains of department stores are driving at. For him a chain means a number of controlled outlets, each operating along lines laid down by the central organisation and selling merchandise bought centrally or at least approved by the central merchandising organisation. That each store should have its own merchandising organisation, and presume to say which of the policies of the central organisation it cared to follow, is unthinkable [Guernsey, 1929: 35–6].

Associations and combinations of stores generally involved enterprises that were not in direct competition with each other. They were geographically dispersed or catered for customers in different socio-economic groups. The seven outlets comprising City Stores were scattered from Newark, N.J. to Birmingham, Alabama. Those in the Hahn group ranged in space and scale from a large store in Boston to a small 'department store' in Lake Charles, Louisiana [Guernsey, 1929: 112, 118–19, 127–8]. This complicated moves to create a central-buying organisation. It is notable, however, that even in the case of the W.A. Wieboldt ownership group, which brought together four stores in the city of Chicago, central buying at the end of the 1920s 'was limited to yard goods, cheap dresses, ribbons, luggage and novelties'. Within large ownership groups such as Hahn Department Stores, Associated Department Stores and May Department Stores, buying stayed disaggregated at the level of the heads of departments in individual stores. At that time, even in an integrated concern like the Gimbel Brothers' four stores in the Midwest, the company in the late 1920s was only 'experimenting with central buying for the men's shoe departments'.

It is notable that central-buying by department-store ownership groups and integrated concerns in the interwar era was restricted to 'standard' or 'staple' items and low-priced merchandise, which required little specialised knowledge. With American Department Stores by 1930, for example, it was still confined to 'shoes, millinery and low-priced ready-to-wear clothing'. In the case of Hale Brothers on the West Coast central buying at that time was limited to 'domestic gloves, hosiery, (sic) men's furnishings, work clothes, drugs, toys and gift lines' [Falk, 1930: 266].

To the extent that the stores involved in a merger continued to merchandise independently, they could not be considered as a true chain enterprise. In fact the amalgamations tended to magnify what had become a problem of the individual department store by the 1920s, which stemmed from its delegated managerial authority. In the individual store the head of each department tended to act essentially in the interests of his particular department. In the concerns resulting from mergers, the central management of each store tended also to do likewise.

The geographical dispersal of stores involved in mergers, combined with the variation in the socio-economic categories of customers they appealed to, could be interpreted as a means of spreading risk in the relatively uncertain economic climate after the First World War. However, the contemporary evidence indicates that the primary motivation was to gain access to economies of bulk purchasing and that the objective was largely frustrated by the inherited structure of the department store.

Apart from variations in the markets that individual department stores in integrated concerns catered for, as established enterprises there was at least a short-term risk of losses arising from adopting a new approach to merchandising or, in the absence of such a reorganisation, there was the cost of adding another tier of management. With a move to central purchasing mistakes could be magnified in their seriousness for the profitability of the concern. Where the individual stores entered into a loose association rather than a complete merger of interests, as was mostly the case in the 1920s, if they fully integrated purchasing there was the hazard that if the association did not last they would have to recreate a buying organisation [Mazur, 1927: 95].

The common department store practice of allocating overheads that could not be charged to specific departments (such as the costs of general administration) on the basis of volume of sales was reasonably equitable before the 1920s, when all departments experienced more or less continuously increasing turnover. Thereafter, however, with enhanced chain-store competition focused especially upon certain lines of merchandise, departments that continued to expand sales were penalised by having to bear an increased proportion of such costs, on account of the sales of other departments declining [Emmet, 1930: 22–3].

VI

The interwar era is generally acknowledged as witnessing the rapid growth of chain stores based on highly centralised management. The 1920s has been referred to as 'the chain store decade' [Palmer, 1930: 224]. The trade magazine launched in the 1920s appeared under the title *The Chain Store Age*.

Chain stores existed before 1914, essentially in the USA and Britain, with Woolworths, A & P, Lewis's, Marks & Spencer and other multiples that were to become household terms in the future originating in the later nineteenth century. However, the rate of expansion before 1914 was slow by comparison with the interwar era. Thereafter, the increase in the share of retail sales was extremely rapid. Depending upon definition as to what comprised a 'chain' concern, by 1929 they had captured between 20 and 30 per cent of retail turnover in the USA [Beckman and Nolen, 1938: 2–3].

The available means of transportation before the 1920s was a constraint on the expansion of the geographically scattered, individually relatively small retail outlets of chain-store concerns. Dependence on the railway system necessitated investment in warehousing facilities in reasonably close proximity to stores owned by the chain. With an emphasis on high turnover, at low profit margins, control over warehousing was of vital importance to chains [Hayward and White, 1928: 39]. In the large geographical area of the USA, as chains became increasingly national rather than sectional in the interwar era, an extent of warehousing by the concerns remained a necessity. However, the appearance of motor transport and a national highway system enabled goods increasingly to be supplied directly from the plants of contracted manufacturers to a rapidly expanding number of stores.[7] The operation was handled by the establishment of 'traffic departments'.

The increase in the real disposable incomes of the working-class from the later-nineteenth century, and especially during most of the interwar era, provided a particular boost to the development of chain stores in the grocery and 'variety goods' areas. Into the 1920s: 'chain stores were regarded as merchandising ventures exclusively devoted to the interests of the poorer classes. To be seen going in or out of a chain store was to be avoided' [Hayward and White, 1928: 76; see also Baxter, 1928: 111; Guernsey, 1929: 28, 181].

The main promotional tactic successfully employed by the 'variety' chain stores into the interwar era was the fixed price limit, as in Woolworth's 'five and ten' (or 'nickel and dime') or in Britain the 3d. and 6d. limits adopted when the concern commenced operations in that country from 1909, or the 'Penny Bazaar' concept promoted by Marks & Spencer before 1914. This stratagem, combined with an absence of the pressure to buy typical of other retail outlets before and beyond 1914, attracted working-class customers. Into the 1920s Marks & Spencer's stores displayed a 'free entry' sign in their windows. One contemporary term employed to describe such retail outlets was 'poor man's department store'.[8] They were also typically established before the First World War in relatively small urban centres where the total purchasing power of the relatively affluent was insufficient for a profitable department store [Hayward, 1924: 223].

Improvements in accounting methods from the 1910s also seem to have assisted the development of chain store concerns. For example, by the 1920s the J.C. Penney concern was 'able to employ highly expert accountants, as well as the best mechanical devices for simplifying and expediting accounting operations' [Darby, 1928: 93].

However, a fundamental constraint on the expansion of the chain-store form of retailing before 1914 derived from the centralised form of organisation within the context of the distribution environment of that era and the subsequent monitoring costs involved.[9] Communications were not adequate for the exercise of centralised control over stores scattered over more than a relatively limited geographical area. The deskilling of sales staff through manufacturer pre-packaging was still in comparative infancy and largely confined to the grocery trade, where chain stores emerged particularly early. It is notable that chains were slow to develop in such branches of retailing as jewellery, hardware, pharmacy (drug stores) and fruit and vegetables. In the case of hardware, and the same applies overall to drug stores and jewellery, this has been attributed to the range of merchandise required to be stocked (which limited turnover) and the extent of knowledge necessary on the part of store management and sales staff in order to sell a lot of the products [Palmer, 1930: 238–9]. With fruit and vegetables, in the existing state of transportation and refrigeration, retailing necessitated local purchasing, which precluded access to the key economies of the chain store: namely, the centralisation of buying and the placing of bulk orders to obtain discounts. It also required substantial store-manager buying ability and initiative.

A major constraint on the geographical spread of chain stores before the First World War was the difficulties involved in the exercise of central control. It is notable that the initial expansion of the F.W. Woolworth concern, from the 1880s to the merger of interests in 1912, consisted of partnerships each operating a small number of stores, which evolved into several individually operated and regionally demarcated chains involving Frank Winfield Woolworth and his relatives and friends. The evolution of the Woolworth concern has been viewed as a mechanism for raising the required capital for expansion. It is equally likely to have reflected contemporary problems in chain-store management.

The early organisation of the F.W. Woolworth concern, reflecting that of department stores, was characterised by a degree of autonomy afforded individual store managers. Although required to take initial consignments of goods from the New York headquarters, they were allowed to decide whether or not to re-order items and, if the decision was positive, in what quantities [Brough, 1982: 100–1].

With the rapid expansion in the number of chain-store outlets from the 1910s a problem became the acquisition of suitable managers for them [Baxter, 1928: 110; Hayward and White, 1928: 34, 327]. The personal characteristics required of a chain-store manager were essentially honesty, efficiency in the supervision of sales staff, willingness to follow orders issued from the head office and limited ambition. With the J.C. Penney chain: 'The qualifications considered of most importance in the (sic) new man ... are character and the capacity to develop in the desired direction'. From that perspective the Penney concern excluded from employment 'men who drink, gamble, or smoke cigarettes, or do not keep the right kind of company' [Darby, 1928: 101]. At interviews for the W.T. Grant chain, among the headings under which notes were taken, the first was : 'Personal appearance – Is he clean and in no way repulsive'. Another, concerning 'Industry and reliability' asked: 'Has he made consistent, even though it may be slow, advancement in the various jobs which he has had' [Hayward and White, 1928: 244]. Time and circumstances were required to provide a pool of potential recruits who matched the requisite criteria.

According to a recent study the basic constraint on the expansion of chain-store concerns was the available supply of 'competent, trustworthy, and loyal men to manage their stores' [Raucher, 1991: 131]. (By contrast it could be said of the typical department-store buyer that: 'he is not store-minded. His principal concern is his own department, happen what may to the rest [Emmet, 1930: 42].) In the recruitment of store managers, and potential executives, chain stores evinced a general preference for young men first entering employment (rather than persons with experience in retailing) who had a high school rather than university education. This reflected a notion that graduates would tend to have ambitions that the organisation could not satisfy and an emphasis upon 'training on the job'. As Frank Woolworth observed: 'I prefer the boy from the farm to the college man. The college man won't start at the bottom and learn the business' [Hayward and White, 1928: 248].

The emerging major chains soon developed training or 'education' departments to inculcate the particular approach of the concern to retailing. Here, aside from imparting knowledge of sales techniques, including those particular to the firm, the emphasis was upon disseminating a 'company ethos'. According to a contemporary source: 'The chain organisation is held together by a form of morale – a combination of hope of reward and fear of discipline'. And further: 'The higher the degree of morale that exists in an organisation, the less necessity there is for policing' [Hayward and White, 1928: 9]. The chain-store form of retailing epitomised the exploitation of the 'insights' provided by Taylor (and of Pavlov rather than Freud). A common criticism of the form of retailing in the USA in the 1920s was that it was creating 'a nation of clerks' [Palmer, 1930: 241].

Reflecting attitudes of the time, in spite of widespread acknowledgement in the sector that a major constraint on chain store expansion consisted of the supply of potential shop managers with the requisite attributes, very few companies considered recruiting women for these positions. Exceptions by 1920s included the Macdiarmid Candy Company's single-staffed outlets and Kuhn's 'five-and-twenty-five cent' stores, where all the managers were females. The major reason in the case of the latter chain of stores in small towns in the South was that 'women, particularly negro women, like to shop where there are no men present' [Hayward and White, 1928: 250]. Otherwise, the great majority of chains, like the Woolworth concern, took 'the position that the salesgirls are primarily wrapping and change-making machines and they make little effort to pick for sales ability' [Baxter, 1928: 133]. Nevertheless, with an expanding pool of males possessing secondary school qualifications, chains were able to persist with their sexist recruitment policy until quite recent times.

VII

The modern history of retailing is indicative that the responses to challenges were quite different to those of contemporaneous manufacturing. The latter, from the eighteenth century through the medium of the 'factory', involving a highly centralised organisational form, was able to exploit economies of scale through the division of labour and ensuing mechanisation of processes. In the twentieth century, partly at least in response to diminishing returns to scale in many cases and uncertain market circumstances, the emphasis in the secondary sector shifted to the pursuit of economies of scope.

With retailing the most significant development of the nineteenth century was the emergence of the department store. To an extent this enterprise form exploited available economies of scale. Essentially, however, success was founded on the pursuit of economies of scope, through a devoluted form of managerial organisation. Thereafter, from around 1914, the buyer-focused structure of the department store became an obstacle to the exploitation of potential economies of scale in retailing. In the interim, the by now traditional department store through emerging circumstances (most notably enhanced protectionism and a range of consumer durables) faced obstacles to the further exploitation of economies of scope. The opportunity provided, with developments in the external retailing environment, was to be successfully exploited by chain stores.

NOTES

1. In this work the term 'department store' is employed to embrace department store chains, discount store chains, holding companies, independent department stores and speciality stores [Bluestone et al., 1981: 4].
2. That Bon Marché became a 'model' department store is indicated by the number that adopted that name elsewhere, including in London, Liverpool, Southport, New York and Seattle [Porter, 1971: 65; Ferry, 1960: 349–50]. Architecturally, the Mark Foy store that opened on Elizabeth Street in Sydney in 1908 was inspired by the original Bon Marché establishment.
3. The need for specialised knowledge did not necessarily dictate such a degree of decentralisation. The relevant transactions costs involved were also important. [See Williamson, 1985: 68–83. For the property rights argument, see Hart and Moore, 1990: 1119–58.]
4. John Wanamaker's original conception in the mid-1870s, when he moved to create a large store in Philadelphia, was to lease out selling space surplus to requirements for his men's and boy's clothing business; with the enterprise being conducted under his overall control (including advertising, which he considered his *forté*). Local specialty retailers proved averse to his efforts to persuade them of the merits of the arrangement; in particular the degree of sacrifice of their 'independence' that involved. Therefore, circumstances forced him to adopt the department-store form of retailing [Gibbons, 1926: I, 161–2, 166–8].
5. Wanamaker's other talent was as a cloth buyer for what was originally a men's and boys' tailoring business. Referring to the pre-department store phase of the business, one of his biographers has stated that: 'A large measure of his success lay in the fact that he was his own buyer' [Gibbons, 1926: I, 188].

6. Not all Wanamaker's promotional innovations were successful. In the early days at the Oak Hall clothing store, owned in partnership with Nathan Brown, he installed a large gong at the entrance that was struck every time a customer entered. Some were annoyed and the rest embarrassed. After a time distributing calendars as promotional material, 'it occurred to him that people looked more frequently at the clock than at the calendar'. So he had wall clocks placed in locations around the city with the firm's name etc. on the dial. This worked well as a promotional device until the clocks began to keep poor time [Gibbons, 1926: I, 101, 103].
7. In Britain motorisation enabled Marks & Spencer, even as a national chain, to do without warehousing by the later 1920s; with that at Manchester being the last to be closed in 1927 [Rees, 1973: 43].
8. The importance attached to the fixed price limit by 'variety' stores is indicated by the extent to which it was adhered to through the inflation beginning in 1914. The F.W. Woolworth concern did not raise the 10 cent price limit to 20 cents until 1932, in spite of increasing difficulties in finding items to sell at prices within the limit established in the mid-1880s [Phillips, 1935: 234]. In Australia the Coles chain maintained (until the Second World War) a limit of 2s. 6d. (raised from 1s. in 1919), although this involved selling pyjama tops and bottoms, and even left and right shoes, as separate items [McLaughlin, 1991: 36].
9. In their now 'classic' paper Alchian and Demsetz argued that monitoring costs determine the size and the structure of firms [Alchian and Demsetz, 1972: 777–95].

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